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CASE NOTES
accepted an application for membership, a contract for the sale of future
goods's arose with the Club as seller, and the applicant was buyer. Since
the member was to receive a gift each month for the period of his sub-
scription, it appears title to the goods would not pass, and performance of
the contract would not be complete until the goods were delivered. This
conclusion would be inescapable under either the common law or the Uni-
form Sales Act. 17 The agreements with the foreign suppliers are the means
through which the Club effectuates compliance with its obligations to the
Club members. The legal effect of these agreements, as the court held, is that
of a purchase contract by the Club. The transactions between the Club and
its members are contracts of sale of future goods's which become retail
sales upon delivery to the members, and thus, subject to the Federal Re-.
tailers' Excise Tax.
It is significant to note that, once the facts are so construed, a similar
result would have been reached had the Uniform Commercial Code been
applicable. 19
DAVID W. CARROLL
Securities—Liability of an Insider and His Investment Partnership for
Profits Realized on a Short Swing Transaction—Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.—Blau v. Lehman. 1—Petitioner Blau,
a stockholder in Tidewater Associated Oil Company, brought an action on
behalf of his corporation to recover "short swing" profits from the respond-
ents under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 The
respondents were Lehman Brothers, a partnership engaged in investment
banking and the brokering and trading of securities, and Joseph A. Thomas,
a member of Lehman Brothers and a director of Tidewater. The evidence
showed that Lehman Brothers had earned profits out of short swing trans-
actions in Tidewater securities while Thomas was a director. As to charges
of deputization and wrongful use of "inside" information by Lehman
Brothers, the evidence was in conflict. There was testimony that Thomas
18 N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 46:30-1, 11(1) (1937).
17 U.S.A. § 19 is declaratory of the common law on this point. Cassinelli v. Humphrey
Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523 (1919) ; 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 14, at
§ 279a. If a contrary intent were not manifested, certain guides were established for
ascertaining intent. As codified by the U.S.A. one rule stated: "If a contract to sell
requires the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer . . . the property does not pass until
the goods have been delivered. ..." 1 Uniform Laws Ann. § 19, rule 5.
18 Supra note 16.
19 UGC	 2-401(2): "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer
at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to
the physical delivery of the goods . . . (b) if the contract requires delivery at destina-
tion, title passes on tender there." New Jersey has adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code; it is effective January 1, 1963. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 12A:1-101 to 12A:10-106 (1961).
1 82 S. Ct. 451 (1962).
2 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
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mentioned to some of his partners that Tidewater was "an attractive invest-
ment" and under "good" management, brit had never discussed the operating
details of Tidewater affairs. There was further testimony that the firm
bought 50,000 shares of stock of Tidewater solely on the basis of public an-
nouncements by Tidewater. The District Court, finding no evidence of
deputization nor actual use of inside information, granted judgment for the
firm, but held Thomas liable for his proportionate share of the profits. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of the United States also affirmed, two justices dissenting. HELD:
Neither the partnership nor the partner-director is absolutely liable under
section 16(b) for all the partnership's profits where the partner was not on
the corporate board to represent the partnership and where the profits were
made on the partnership's own initiative, independently of any "inside"
knowledge given by such partner.
Before the enactment of section 16(b), most courts held that a corporate
officer or director did not owe a fiduciary duty to stockholders to divulge
advance undisclosed information, and aggrieved stockholders, therefore, had
no right to recover from the insider.° Although the United States Supreme
Court in Strong v. Repide4
 created a "special circumstances" doctrine, even
this remedy was inadequate because of the difficult burden of proof imposed
upon the stockholders.° In 1934, Congress enacted Section 16(b) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act which provides that "short swing" profits realized by an
officer, director, or ten percent stockholder on the purchase and sale, or sale
and purchase, of an equity security of his corporation shall inure to the
corporation. The primary purpose of the act was to ensure a fair and honest
market, and section 16(b) was designed specifically to provide an effective
remedy against trading within a six months' period by "insiders" with
advance undisclosed information .°
Despite its seemingly simple prophylactic nature, Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has been described as "the most subtle and
least understood" provision of the act. 7
 The Second Circuit, wherein' most
3 E.g., Blabon v. Hay, 269 Mass. 401, 169 N.E. 268 (1929); Walsh v. Goulden, 130
Mich. 531, 90 N.W. 406 (1902) ; Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266 (1922).
See Hearings on S.84, S.56 and S.97 Before Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933); 73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 7741-42 (1934). See
also S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 68 (1934).
4 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
5 See Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section
16(h) of the Sec. Exch. Act, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 133, 139 (1939) ; Lake, The Use For
Personal Profit of Knowledge Gained While a Director, 9 Miss. L.J. 427, 443 (1937).
8 See Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Committee on Inter-
state Commerce and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 85 (1934); Hearings on
S.84, S.56 and S.97, supra note 3, at 6557L59.
7 Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 385, 406 (1953) ; See Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determin-
ing Insider Liabilities under Section 16(b), 45 Va. L. Rev. 949, 950 (1959).
Although the act has been on the books for 27 years, Blau v. Lehman is the first
Supreme Court decision concerning § 16(b).
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of the cases under section 16(b) have arisen, 8 described• the statute as
intended to be "thorough going, to squeeze all possible profits out of [insider]
stock transactions, and thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent
any conflict [of interests]."° The judicial interpretations of section 16(b)
reflect that the courts have not hesitated to strain the ordinary meaning of
the terms used in the section in order to eliminate the opportunities for the
insider to profit through such transactions. 1° The courts, as a result, have
tended to give the section maximum effectiveness. However, to this 'uniform
interpretation, there now appears to be one notable exception, the decision
in Blau v. Lehman. The law appears to be settled, as a result of the instant
case, that the mere fact that a partner's firm had a "short swing" transaction
in the stock of a corporation in which he was a director at the same time is
not sufficient to make the partnership liable for the profits thereon, nor the
partner-director liable for the profits realized by his co-partners. Judge
Clark, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, stated that this principle was
"anomalous in granting exemption in the very cases where the incentive to
take insiders' profits is strongest as a part of a trading firm's normal busi-
ness. . . ." 11
 The placement of partners on the boards of various corporations
is a necessary requirement in the operations of an investment business. 12
Since investment firms are in a position to obtain confidential information
from a partner-director and, furthermore, since the directorships 'are clearly
accessible to the firms, 13
 it would seem that holding these investment firms
liable would "better effectuate the purposes of the statute and be more in
accord with the liberal approach taken by courts in construing .. , section
8 See Meeker, supra note 7, at 951.
9 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943). See Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir. 1960) (dissent of Judge Clark).
10 See Note, 10 U. Pa. L. Rev. 463, 464 (1951); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840
(2d Cir. 1959) (liable for sale of stock purchased prior to becoming a director);
Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949) (employee in a position likely to obtain
confidential information); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958) (inactive
director); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947) (exercise of an
option to convert preferred held a purchase); compare Ferraiolo v. Newman, supra,
(forced conversion held not a purchase).
See also Fruncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (receipt of stock
warrants in connection with employment contract found a purchase); compare Shaw v.
Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949) (stock options not a purchase).
See § 3(a)(13), 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13) (1958) (purchase
includes "any contract to buy, purchase or otherwise acquire"); § 3(a)(14), 48 Stat.
882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1958) (sale includes "any contract to sell or other-
wise dispose of").
11 286 F.2d at 793-94.
12 In United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 715, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), the
court found that Lehman Bros. did have such a policy in order to support "their com-
petitive efforts."
13 82 S. Ct. at 457, 460. See the approach of Judge Fahy in Lehman v. CAB, 209
F.2d 289, 292-94 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 916 (1954). "Whenever the
partner's acts as a director might further the interest of the partnership in accordance
with the intended purposes of the firm in performing such acts, it must be concluded
that the partner represents the firm." However, this case did involve a statute which
has its own distinct language, purpose and history.
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16 (b) . "14 Such a result would not deter an admittedly necessary practice
since it would only affect the "short swing" transaction. The harshness of
total liability is certainly no greater than that of an individual insider who
profits without actual use of undisclosed information.
In the concurring opinion in Rattner v. Lehman," decided some years
ago by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand
suggested a potential remedy within the framework of 16(b), although it
would require a subjective standard of proof. By establishing that the firm
had "deputed a partner to represent its interests as a director on the board,"
the court would not be precluded from considering the firm an "insider"
within the meaning of 16(b), on the theory that a partnership under certain
circumstances may be treated as a "jural person." The majority," how-
ever, in the Court of Appeals decision of Blau v. Lehman, rejected the sug-
gestion, reasoning that no amount of "deputizing" of a partner could render
the partnership itself a "director" within the section. Unfortunately, Hand's
dictum went untested when the Court of Appeals found evidence of "depu-
tization" by the firm lacking. The Supreme Court, in contrast, did accept
the proposition first intimated by Hand ten years previously, but due to
the same fact deficiency, it is again only dictum. Mr. Justice Black, speak-
ing for the majority, reasoned that a partnership could be a "director" and
function through a deputy since section 3(a) (9) of the act 18 provides that
" 'person' means .. . partnerships," and section 3 (a) (7) 1° provides that
" 'director' means any director of a corporation or any person performing
similar functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or
unincorporated."20 But he concluded that "the findings of the two courts
below, which we have accepted, preclude such a holding."21
 Mr. Justice
Black further remarked that the intent of 3(a) (9) "is merely to make it
clear that a partnership can be treated as an entity . .. not that it must
be."22 He thus rejected any possibility of regarding the firm as a "director"
without resorting to the "deputization" theory.
The insertion by judicial implication of this subjective element (depu-
tization) as a requirement of proof is open to the same criticism which
dictated the objective form of the final enactment of 16(b), namely, the
practical impossibility of enforcing a subjective standard of Iiability. 23
19 Note, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 926, 930 (1961).
15 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952). Lehman Brothers also appeared as the defendant
firm in this case, and the defendant partner was the predecessor of the present defendant
partner.
16 Id. at 567.
17 286 F.2d at 789.
18 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (9) (1958).
la 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15	 § 78c(a) (7) (1958).
28 82 S. Ct. at 455.
21 Id. See Note, supra note 14, at 928-30, in which it is argued that "if the deputiza-
tion theory has any vitality, it . . . seems that the facts of the instant case fall within its
bounds."
22 Supra note 20.	 .
23 See the testimony of Mr. Corcoran, chief spokesman for the draftsmen and
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Therefore, no question of intention or subjective good faith is raised by the
statute, and a corporation may recover such profits even though there had
been no actual use of confidential information by the "insider," 24 This, in
effect, imposes liability upon the mere showing of access to inside informa-
tion which might be used. Similar difficulties of proof also would exist as to
whether a partner has advised other members of his firm as to such informa-
tion. It would appear that the "deputization" theory would be extremely
impractical since, in essence, any partner-director represents his firm's in-
terests in the corporate management 2 5 A realistic appraisal would lead to
the conclusion that a partner either actually knows what is going on in his
firm or is content to leave action to his partners. In either instance it would
be naive to believe that proof would not be practically insurmountable. As
Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissenting opinion, "formal designa-
tion is no more significant than informal approval."" He felt that it would
be easier to make the partnership a "director" than to hold the opposite.
By stressing sections 3(a) (7) and 3(a) (9), 27 Mr. Justice Douglas empha-
sized that such a result "need not turn on a strained reading" of section
16(b).28 In view of the objective standard employed by 16(b), it is entirely
reasonable to apply the same standard to a partnership situation without
actual proof that the partner was appointed as a director to benefit his
partnership or that he actually transmitted confidential information to his
colleagues. Finally, to give any other construction to the language of
section 16(b) is to attribute to Congress an intent at variance with that to
which it gave clear expression.
Judge Clark, dissenting in Blau v. Lehman in the Court of Appeals,"
contended that the partner-director should be liable under section 16(b)
proponents of the act, Hearings on S.84, S.56 and 5.47, supra note 2, at 6557 wherein
he stated: "You hold the director, irrespective of any intention ... because it will be
absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention . • • and ... because you
cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director intended, at the
time he bought, to get out in a short swing."
See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
24 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., supra note 9, at 239; Ferraiolo v. Newman, supra
note 10, at 344; Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
25 Note, supra note 14. See note 13 supra.
28 82 S. Ct. at 458.
27 Supra notes 18-19.
28 In United States v. A. & P. Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958), the Supreme
Court held a partnership could be criminally liable under the Motor Carrier Act.
Although the act had not explicitly subjected partnerships to criminal liability, the
Court reasoned that Congress had "specifically included partnerships within the defini-
tion of 'person' in a large number of regulatory Acts, thus showing its intent to treat
partnerships as entities." See, e.g., Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 979 (1938), 49
U.S.C. 401(27) (1958) ; Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1066 (1934), 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(i) (1958) ; Shipping Act, 39 Stat. 729 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1958) ; Tariff Act,
46 Stat. 708 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1401(d) (1958). This case is more severe in its impact
since § 16(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is not penal, but of a remedial and
deterrent nature.
29 286 F.2d at 794-95.
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for the entire profit of his firm. He stressed traditional partnership law
which gives each partner an undivided interest in the entire partnership
profit. 'Under New York Partnership Law a partner is considered a co-
owner3° and, further, the partnership is charged with the knowledge of, or
notice to, its partners al Under any "literal legal reading" of the act, he
argued, the partner was a co-owner and charged with knowledge of the
transaction and, consequently, realizes the entire profit." However, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, rejected this contention
by stating that "liability under 16(b) is [not] to be determined ... by gen-
eral partnership law!" 33 He felt that the section left no doubt that a
director is only liable for "any profit realized by him." 34 '
The contention of Judge Clark may appear to be harsh as to imposition
of total liability. Admittedly the statute does operate stringently • with
resulting burdens to individuals in many cases, but, as Judge Clark stated,
"that seems not a sound reason for excepting its operation in this important
and natural field of operation."" Exemption in the investment firm area
would be difficult to explain to the "ordinary small-scale director not so
exempt. and indeed to the investing public generally." Furthermore, an
assumption of the risk factor is present in 'this area. No one is obliged to
become a director, but, as soon as he does so, be accepts whatever limita-
tions, obligations and conditions attached to the position. Thus, it may
be argued that the partner-director accepts the apparent unfairness of total
liability by becoming a director in the issuing corporation.
The petitioner also contended that even if the court were to conclude
that a partnership could not be considered a director in the absence of proof
of deputization and that the individual partner-director could not be held
liable for the total profit made by the partnership, nonetheless, strong policy
80
 N.Y. Partnership Law §§ 12, 40, 43, 50-53. See Soloman Bros. & Hutzler v.
Pedrick, 105 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Kraus v. Kraus, 250 N.Y. 65, 164 N.E.
743 (1928).
31 N.Y. Partnership Law 23. Purchases and sales of securities by the partnership
are in legal effect purchaies and sales by all of its partners. N. Y. Partnership Law 1 51.
Section 42 requires the partner to disclose all pertinent information to his partnership.
32
 In an analogous situation in Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., supra note
24, an "insider" could not avoid liability for the full profit by alleging his wife's un-
divided one-half interest, under community property law. To the extent that the
opinion in Walet is predicated upon the right of a husband to control a wife's half
interest, its precedent value to the partnership situation is weakened. See Brief for the
SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 20, Blau v. Lehman, 82 S. Ct.'451 (1962).
33 82 S. Ct. at 457.
34
 The two courts below held that the partner's proportionate share was "realized"
despite the fact that he had waived all interest in the transaction. The ineffectiveness of
a waiver, not previously considered by the courts before Blau v. Lehman, was not
challenged at the Supreme Court level. The Court therefore expressed no view on this
question. Furthermore, there may be much significance in the holding of an individual
partner-director liable for his share of the profit, not only where he made no use of
inside information, but also where he was unaware of the actual transaction. However,
the contention in the two courts below that he realized no profit at all was not argued
at the Supreme Court level.
88 286 F.2d at 793.
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factors required that section 16(b) be controlling. In other words, petitioner
argued that the partnership should be liable even though it is neither a
director, officer, nor a ten percent stockholder. It was urged that 16(b)
should be expanded to cover partnerships , in which a director is a member
in order to carry out the congressionally declared purpose of "preventing the
unfair use of information which may have been obtained by an [insider] .. .
by reason of his relationship to the issuer." 3° Avoidance of the statute could
be accomplished by the practice of the mere exchange of information among
partners who are insiders of different corporations." As Mr. Justice Douglas
expressed, it allows "all but one partner to share in the feast" and "they in
turn can offer feasts to him in the 99 other companies of which they are
directors." 38 The incentive, therefore, to use confidential information might
be enhanced since the loss would be minimal."
These persuasive policy arguments might be limitless and, in effect,
extended to include all persons realizing "short swing" profits who have
access to "inside" information. The Supreme Court felt that this "very
broadening of categories . was considered and rejected by Congress when
it passed the Act." The original draft would have made all profits received
by anyone, insider or not, to whom unlawful disclosure had been made
recoverable by the corporation4° Congress realized that the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit refused in the Rattner case to apply 16(b)
under similar circumstances. From this the Supreme Court reasoned that
the interpretation of the legislative history was supplemented by the fact
that Congress could have but never did expressly provide for third person
liability. 4'
88 Securities Exchange Act, supra note 2.
For similar treatment of an analogous problem in the context of Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act, see In re Midland United Co., 159 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1947) ; In re
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 37 F. Supp. 708, 711 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (law firm not
entitled to compensation when one of its partner-directors dealt with bonds of the
debtor:while reorganization proceedings were pending). Note, however, that § 16(b)
does not have a catchall phrase as the phrase "other persons acting in the proceedings
in a representative or fiduciary capacity" in § 249. Bankruptcy Act § 249, 52 Stat.
901 (1938), Il U.S.C. § 649 (1958).
87 Cook & Feldman, supra note 7, at 629.
38 82 S. Ct. at 460.
38 Apart from any moral obligation it would appear that the partnership is
legally obligated to reimburse the partnir-director. Section 40(2) of the N.Y. partner-
ship law requires indemnification by the partnership for "personal liabilities reasonably
incurred by [the partner) in the ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or for the
preservation of its business or property." The problem, therefore, is to determine
whether liability incurred by Thomas falls within the language of § 40(2). At first
glance, the violation of a federal statute should preclude his conduct from being
classified as "ordinary and proper." However, Thomas was in no way a participant in
nor was he aware of the transaction. It is apparent, as a result, that his conduct was
"ordinary and proper."
40 See § 15(b) (3) of H.R. 7852 and S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
41 See Seventeenth Annual Report of the Securities & Exchange Commission, p. 62
(1952); Eighteenth Annual Report, p. 79 (1953). These reports were submitted to
Congress.
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It is possible that the legislative history would not warrant the Court's
conclusion that third parties were intentionally omitted from coverage under
the act. The hearings seem to indicate that Congress deleted the provision
because of anticipated administrative difficulties of proving the use of inside
information." Thus, it is persuasive that Congress may have favored an
automatic application of the statute without necessity of such proof." As
stated previously, the dictum in the present case forces the very step which
Congress avoided, namely, a subjective standard of proof requiring a show-
ing of actual unfair use of inside information. Furthermore, recognizing that
"large areas of insider conduct was consciously left untouched by Congress
for reasons dictated by practicalities rather than ethics or pure logic" and
that section 16(b) must be interpreted to achieve fully its intended purposes,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in Alder v. Klawans:
[W]e must glean from the Statute as a whole rather than
from isolated parts, we must consider the results which would flow
from each of the two interpretations contended for . . . If we find
one interpretation tends to carry out and the other to defeat the
purposes of the Statute, the resolution of the issues becomes simple
. . . [B]ut the consciously limited scope of the statute is no reason
for us to seek yet further limitations of what is remedial legisla-
tion:44
In conclusion, however, Mr. Justics Black justifiably stated "that Con-
gress is the proper agency to change an interpretation of the Act unbroken
since its passage, if the change is to be made." 45 Unfortunately, he did
approve the "deputization" test which also should have been left to legisla-
tive initiative. This leads to further problems of interpretation and policy.
Assuming the firm did "deputize" a partner to represent its interests as a
director on the board, would this imply that the director would have to be
active in the purchase and sale by the partnership in order to view the
firm as a "jural person" before treating the firm as the director and allowing
full recovery? Would the result be the same if the director was a mere
employee of the partnership? Would formal deputization be required or
would it be sufficient, alone, that the partner was instrumental in effecting
the transaction? How extensive must the knowledge and participation of the
insider be to create complete liability on the firm or the insider-partner?
42 See Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, supra note 6, at 135 et seq. and
Hearings on S.84, S.56 and S.97, supra note 6, at 6555, 6558, 6560-62.
43 286 F.2d at 794 (dissent of Judge Clark).
44
 267 F.2d 840, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1959). See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106,
112 (1948) ; SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943) (read and
interpreted "so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative
policy") ; Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) ("treacherous to find in
Congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law"). Compare United
States v. Great Northern Ry., 343 U.S. 562, 575 (1952) ("judicial function to apply
statutes on the basis of what Congress has written, not what Congress might have
written").
45 82 S. Ct. at 457.
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Should recovery be allowed where persons other than directors, officers, and
ten percent stockholders who, because of their relationship to insiders,
whether it be through marriage, friendship, partnership or other business
associations, might be presumed to have access to confidential information?
These difficulties lend themselves to legislative inquiry and enactments
better than to judicial contortions. Quite clearly, Congress should act, since
Blau v. Lehman has clearly established that there is no provision in the act
to curb the transfer to and the use of confidential information by non-
insiders and, especially, the investment brokerage firms.
RICHARD M. GABERMAN
Trade Regulations—Sherman Act—Conspiracy—Conscious Parallelism.
—Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co.1—The
Delaware Valley Marine Supply Company was organized to sell tax-free
tobacco and liquor to vessels engaged in foreign trade in the Port of Phila-
delphia. In order to purchase tax-free cigarettes a ship chandler must obtain
a direct listing. The Supply Company applied for the listing to five major
tobacco companies doing business in the Port. Each company had at least
one distributor for the Port at that time, Lipschutz Bros. R. J. Reynolds and
P. Lorillard also sold to a third distributor who dealt in all ship supplies.
Two companies refused by letter, two did not reply and Philip Morris de-
clined to grant the listing after a preliminary investigation. This precluded
plaintiff from entering the sea stores business. Plaintiff brought this suit for
treble damages alleging a conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.2 The plaintiff did not introduce direct evidence of conspiracy but relied
heavily on "conscious parallelism," claiming that the tobacco companies
showed a consciously uniform business behavior by their refusals. It was
common knowledge in the business that to sell sea stores, all the major
brands of cigarettes must be procured. There was other evidence that the
cigarette companies were adequately represented in this market, that their
sales were increasing and that they had no financial interest in the com-
petitor, Lipschutz, which would prompt the alleged behavior. The lower
court granted the defendants a directed verdict on the ground that the
plaintiff had not proved damage, 3 expressly avoiding the question of con-
spiracy.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed. HELD: Even assuming the evi-
dence supported the existence of conscious parallelism, the plaintiff had
1 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), petition for cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. Week 3267 (Feb, 20,
1962) (No. 734).
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C, § 1 (1958). The section in substance
provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. . . ."
3
 Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp. 440
(E.D. Pa. 1961).
4
 Id. at 449.
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